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The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement
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of documents from the Sugar Research Foundation demonstrated
that the sugar industry successfully sought to deflect the concerns of health-conscious consumers from sugar to fat.5 Many
countries have curtailed advertising aimed at young people by the
food industry. Tax policies are
increasingly being used to reduce
consumption of sugar-sweetened
beverages in U.S. jurisdictions
and elsewhere, but the American
Beverage Association has vigorously opposed these
An audio interview
with Dr. Healton
efforts, including by
is available at NEJM.org
supporting state preemption. A San Francisco policy
that is currently being adjudicated would support the potential
use of warning labels on sugarsweetened beverages.
The table presents potential

provisions that could result from
litigation or voluntary settlements
with these industries and provisions contained in the MSA.
Combined with tobacco use,
these epidemics (excluding climate change, for which U.S. data
are unavailable) cause nearly one
third of all U.S. deaths. The trajectory of these major public
health problems could be altered
by reducing industry manipulation of science and lobbying for
policies against the public interest; compensating public coffers
for money spent combating these
epidemics and redirecting funds
to prevention; and using public
education, product warnings,
and price increases to reduce
use of harmful products. By using
these strategies, state AGs could
strengthen their consumer-protec-

tion roles as guardians of the
health of the public.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available at NEJM.org.
From the New York University College of
Global Public Health, New York.
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harmaceuticals are consuming
increasingly large portions of
U.S. state budgets, and high prices
are preventing patients from getting, and adhering to, essential
medicines. In mid-May 2018, President Donald Trump announced a
heavily hyped but relatively modest federal plan to bring down
drug prices. Meanwhile, several
states are moving forward with
their own solutions, and Maryland’s approach is particularly ambitious. In 2017, responding to
notorious cases such as the 5000%
increase in the cost of Daraprim
(pyrimethamine) and the 10-fold
increase in the cost of EpiPens
(epinephrine auto-injectors), Maryland enacted a statute that prohibits manufacturers from “price
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gouging” on any “essential offpatent or generic drug” (see box).
But in April 2018, a panel of
the federal Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned the statute.
The two-judge majority reasoned
that the state could not regulate
the prices charged by manufacturers, because they sold to wholesalers in transactions that occurred “wholly” out of state.1 The
court invoked the “dormant commerce clause,” the legal doctrine
holding that the Constitution implicitly restricts states from interfering with interstate commerce,
even when Congress has been
silent regarding the activity in
question.
One judge dissented, arguing
that the Maryland law targets only
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the prices paid for products that
reach Maryland buyers. Manufacturers could simply earmark their
Maryland-bound transactions and
price them to comply with that
state’s laws.
Similarly, the Supreme Court
has recognized that states are free
to impose greater or lesser tort
liabilities on drugs approved by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In the U.S. constitutional system, states are the “laboratories of democracy” that have
the power to regulate on virtually
any subject.2 As the dissent noted,
“numerous States impose safety,
quality, and labeling restrictions
on goods sold by out-of-state manufacturers through out-of-state distributors to in-state consumers.”1
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In some ways, the Maryland
decision echoes the historic Lochner decision of 1905, in which the
Supreme Court invoked a “liberty of contract” to strike down a
New York law regulating the
number of hours per week that
bakers could work.3 In the Lochner era, the Supreme Court routinely and creatively invented constitutional provisions to undermine
progressive state laws. Today, this
sort of judicial meddling is widely
condemned as contrary to democracy and federalism. Like the liberty of contract invoked in Lochner, the dormant commerce clause
is not explicitly laid out in the
Constitution itself.
The dormant commerce clause
arises only from a sense of the
framers’ larger purpose: to create
a single economic union, in which
states would not exercise protectionism to favor local producers.
Yet the Maryland law is not protectionist. It is not as if Maryland
burdened drug makers in New
Jersey and Virginia in order to favor their Maryland competitors,
which is the paradigmatic vio
lation. The Supreme Court has
struck down such an arrangement when New York tried to favor local milk producers by prohibiting out-of-state producers
from undercutting their prices.
The Court has also struck down
laws that pegged local beer prices
to those offered in other states,
because such laws could cause
manufacturers to raise their prices
in other states. Here, Maryland
used no such interstate price peg.
Maryland’s statute also avoids
conflict with federal patent law,
which purposefully gives inventors a monopoly as an incentive.
High prices are part of the design of that federal regime, and
states cannot interfere with that

Maryland’s HB 631, “An Act concerning Public Health — Essential Off-Patent
or Generic Drugs — Price Gouging — Prohibition”
Where consumers have no meaningful choice about an important drug and there is
a lack of competition, the statute prohibits “price gouging”:
• Targeting “unconscionable” price increases, defined as “excessive and not justified by the cost of producing” or expanding access to the drug;
• Applying only to generic medications (for which all exclusive marketing rights
and patents have expired); and
• Applying only to essential medicines, as designated by the World Health Organi
zation or the Maryland Secretary of Health;
The law authorizes the Attorney General to petition a court to restore money to consumers, require manufacturers to provide the drug at the last permissible price, and
order civil penalties.

goal. In contrast, the Maryland
law focuses on generic drugs.
The State of Maryland has
asked that all the judges on the
Fourth Circuit sit together to review the case. The U.S. Supreme
Court may also do so. Either court
could reverse the panel decision.
Congress could also authorize
states to experiment.
If all else fails, the state legislature may try to craft another
solution that avoids the panel’s
opinion. One approach would be
to regulate prices charged to consumers and payers within the
state and allow economic forces
to work their way up the supply
line to the price-gouging manufacturers. If a retailer is unable
to sell at an exorbitant price, then
wholesalers and manufacturers
will be unable to charge unreasonably high prices in the first
place.
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously upheld a different sort of pharmaceutical statute in Maine.4 Maine linked its
Medicaid and uninsured self-pay
markets by imposing a prior-
authorization requirement on expensive drugs sold in its Medicaid system unless manufacturers
agreed to pay a rebate to subsidize private purchases. By targeting transactions within the state,
this law reached the manufactur-
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ers regardless of their out-of-state
wholesalers.
Under any such policy, it will
remain difficult and contentious
to determine what is and is not
an “unconscionable” price and to
set the amount of any required
rebate. Without a more comprehensive system of value-based
pricing, an ad hoc approach will
only generate more litigation.
More important, small states acting alone run the risk that the
manufacturer may just walk away,
refusing to sell at a cut rate. But
that’s the nature of a bargain
with a monopolist.
A better approach, I would argue, is to bring more generics
into the market, creating options
for states and buyers, which will
drive down prices. Although the
FDA approved a record number of
generics in 2017,5 there are still
cases in which the FDA has
authorized no competitors to a
given product, leaving pharmaceutical companies with effective
monopolies. Some potential competitors are barred in the United
States, even though the products
are working safely and effectively
in Canada and Europe. National
borders are, in this sense, harming American patients and payers. Transnational regulatory reciprocity would increase competition
and drive down prices.
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In May 2018, Vermont passed
a law tasking a state agency with
designing a program for importing drugs from Canada, but such
a move also requires federal approval. Giving some preliminary
credence to this approach, in July
2018, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar directed
the FDA to establish a working
group on drug importation as a
means of fighting generic price
hikes.
A promising solution is found
in an initiative led by Intermoun-

tain Healthcare and involving several major hospital groups and the
Department of Veterans Affairs.
Announced in January 2018, this
nonprofit consortium will use a
novel contracting mechanism to
manufacture essential generic
drugs. When progress is stymied
by politics and the courts, innovation may find another path.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available at NEJM.org.
From the University of Arizona College of
Law and the University of Arizona Regulatory Science Program — both in Tucson.

This article was published on August 8,
2018, at NEJM.org.
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T

hroughout the United States,
escalating drug prices are putting immense pressure on state
budgets. Several states are looking for ways to push back. Last
year, Massachusetts asked the
Trump administration for a waiver
that would, among other things,
allow its Medicaid program to
decline to cover costly drugs for
which there is limited or inadequate evidence of clinical efficacy.1 By credibly threatening to
exclude such drugs from coverage, Massachusetts hoped to extract price concessions and constrain the fastest-growing part of
its Medicaid budget.
In late June, however, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) denied Massachusetts’ request.2 On the same day,
the agency issued a memorandum
clarifying that, under requirements
included in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, state
Medicaid programs are legally
obliged to cover all drugs approved by the Food and Drug
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Administration (FDA) — including those approved under the
agency’s less rigorous acceleratedapproval pathway.3
Many of these drugs — including some with uncertain efficacy — are very expensive.
Take, for example, Exondys 51
(eteplirsen), which was approved
for the treatment of Duchenne’s
muscular dystrophy on the basis
of a trial that involved 12 boys
and used a surrogate end point.
The drug’s label states that “a
clinical benefit of Exondys 51
has not been established,” yet the
retail price of the drug is about
$300,000 per year. State Medicaid programs don’t pay full price
— that same 1990 legislation entitles them to a discount that today amounts to at least 23% of
the drug’s average sales price.
Even so, drugs like Exondys 51
are straining state budgets.
To reduce the burden of highcost, low-value drugs, Massachusetts has proposed establishing a
closed formulary, in which certain
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drugs can be excluded from coverage. The Trump administration
might have been expected to
welcome the proposal. At least
rhetorically, it is committed to
reducing drug prices. And closed
formularies are ubiquitous in private insurance and public health
care programs alike. The Veterans
Health Administration uses one,
and Medicare Part D plans can
exclude certain products.
So why not let Massachusetts
try a closed formulary for Medicaid? CMS’s letter to the state
doesn’t say. It is silent on what
exactly is deficient about Massachusetts’ request. The letter does
claim that CMS “would be willing to consider” a closed formulary — but only if Massachusetts
both gives up the steep discounts
that it’s entitled to by law and
demonstrates that its Medicaid
spending won’t increase because
of the changes.
Together, these requirements
create an insuperable obstacle to
any closed formulary. Under CMS’s
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